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Post was part of a crucial adjustment in the Warriors’ win over the Magic.
There were always risks involved in starting a lineup consisting of Steph Curry, Brandin Podziemski, Jimmy Butler, Moses Moody, and Draymond Green — the most obvious of which is the fact that Green is a 6’6” (generously) center who is counted on to guard opposing centers who may have as much as a five-to-six-inch height advantage against him. Having a 7’1” wingspan makes up for a ton of that discrepancy — but more often than not, height will prevail over heart.
In that regard, the Orlando Magic presented a unique challenge for the Golden State Warriors, who — in the Butler era — hadn’t really faced the kind of height and length across the board the Magic possessed in abundance. Not only could switching everything throw a wrench into everything the Warriors tried to do in the half court; even if they got past the point of attack and into the paint, the Magic had a forest of limbs that could come crashing down, ready to block any shot attempt and deflect any desperately thrown pass out of the paint.
That was a problem for only one end of the floor. A team who has had trouble generating half-court offense this season (90.1 points per 100 half-court possessions — 29th in the NBA) is suddenly given relief when the opponents they see in front of them are much smaller than them. The matchups become a predicament for the Warriors: Green has to take the 6’10” Wendell Carter Jr., while Butler has to take the Paolo Banchero reps.
While Butler can be quite the tenacious defender on individual matchups, he gives up three inches in height and approximately 20 pounds to Banchero. Fronting and crowding a taller player’s lower body can be short-term solutions. But a significant height and weight disadvantage is typically hard to overcome:
Moreover, the ultimate weapon to have when a small team goes to a zone — in particular, a 1-3-1 zone the Warriors have been keen on using as of late — is to have height sneak in behind the zone and become unreachable, especially if there’s a significant lack of height to act as a buffer in the backline.
Which is why — facing a 14-point deficit at halftime — Steve Kerr opted to start big: in Moody’s place, the 7-foot Quinten Post was slotted in to play center and guard Carter, which allowed Green to slide over to Banchero. While Green is also shorter than Banchero, his 7’1” wingspan and wider frame can more than compensate for the vertical discrepancy.
Rather than having Green be the last line of defense, Post was then tasked to be the rim-protecting anchor. Previously, the Magic were having their way in the paint because no one could challenge them on a vertical level, Post’s presence immediately gave them that challenge:
While he has made strides as a pick-and-roll defender, Post’s effectiveness as a defender multiplies when he has to guard more stationary play types, such as post-ups. The amusing and rather appropriate nature of a man named Post being more effective as a post-up defender isn’t lost on me — but it wasn’t amusing for Banchero in the possession below:
The irony of Post being named Post comes, rather, on the other end of the floor. Post isn’t known for his effectiveness as a back-to-the-basket center — although give him a significant advantage in the form of a much-smaller defender and he will mash and bash his way to the rim:
But at 40.8% on nearly four attempts per game from beyond the arc, Post provides a dynamic the Warriors haven’t had before from the center position. When the Warriors run a play for Curry out of “Horns” formation (where two players are parked on both elbows and two players are parked on both corners with a ball handler at the top of the key), watch where Post is located in the configuration:
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In “Horns,” bigs are usually at one of the elbows. But Kerr elects to have Post stretch the floor, with Podziemski clearing the right side for Curry, who passes to Butler and comes off of Green’s flare screen:
A successful Curry three compels Kerr to repeat the same exact set the next time around — only for the Magic to be prepared to take away Curry coming off of the flare screen. The next progression of the set is then triggered: Curry running along the baseline, relocating to the opposite side, and coming off of Post’s exit screen:
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Podziemski’s scripted clear out toward the same side where Curry’s coming off of the exit screen clogs the side for any pass coming Curry’s way, which takes away the set’s Plan B. Post is then forced to improvise himself. Seeing that his man (Carter) is parking himself directly underneath the rim with no intention of cozying up, Post realizes that no one is effectively guarding him:
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Rightfully and understandably so, Curry will receive the majority of the attention and heraldry thrown his way: a 56-point performance on 93.5% True Shooting is certainly a headline grabber. But Post’s inclusion in the main five-man group is arguably the momentum shifter the Warriors needed to come back from a 17-point deficit.
Post’s contributions ranged from the eye-catching ones above, to the more subtle nuances that contributed to Curry’s big night. Post is enough of a serviceable screener for Kerr to unholster a classic Curry pick-and-roll set called “Weak Roll.” Knowing that the Magic would simply send two to the ball against a conventional high and angle pick-and-roll for Curry, “Weak Roll” has a layer of preceding action aiming to prevent aggressive coverages:
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Curry’s pass to the wing, the subsequent shallow cut across the floor, and receiving the ball back sets up the crux of the set: Podziemski setting the screen for Post underneath the rim for Post to run toward Curry to set a ball screen (called a “ram” screen, or a screen for someone about to set a ball screen), with the right side of the floor emptied out:
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Being caught in Podziemski’s screen, Post’s man (Goga Bitadze) falls behind. When Post reaches Curry and sets the screen, Bitadze is delayed a significant amount — which renders him unable to meet Curry around the screen:
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The scoring and offensive punch has been greatly appreciated from Post, who supplemented Curry’s output with 18 points on 7-of-9 shooting from the field (2-of-4 on threes). Additionally, the Warriors outscored the Magic by 22 points in his 24 minutes. In addition to being much, much better than expected as a defender, Post has been found money for the Warriors — all while continuing to be a cost-effective option for them, considering he was drafted 52nd and is on a $2.4 million contract that is partially guaranteed.
It wasn’t too long ago that calls for the Warriors to upgrade to a center that could stretch the floor were the loudest voices in the room. Their reticence to pull the trigger for someone like Nikola Vučević may have paid off — with perhaps the internal knowledge that they had someone approximately close to that player profile already waiting in the wings.